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An economic model was analyzed where a new supplier implements the technology of the small cells and positions itself as an
incumbent service provider. This provider performs a dynamic reuse of resources to compete with the macrocells service provider.
Themodel was analyzed using game theory as a two-stage game. In the first stage, the service providers play a Stackelberg differential
game where the price is the control variable, the existing provider is the leader, and the new supplier is the follower. In the second
stage, users’ behavior ismodeled using an evolutionary game that allows predicting the population changeswith variable conditions.
This paper contributes to the implementation of new technologies in the market of mobile communications through analysis of
competition between the new small cell service providers (SSPs) and the existing service providers along with the users’ behavior of
mobile communications. The result shows that users get a better service, SSP profits are guaranteed, and SSP entry improves users’
welfare and social welfare.
1. Introduction
Mobile communications have experienced an enormous
growth and this tendency still continues as the number of
connected users is higher every day. Cisco reports that the
number of connected mobile devices will be around 5500
million in 2020 and that 70% of the world’s population will
be connected [1]. The traffic of mobile data generated will
increase by 800% and the bandwidth demand from users will
grow accordingly. The present times show a picture where
mobile communications and their associated services have
become an everyday need which expresses the users’ need to
be connected all the time, everywhere with better and faster
connections.
This growth has made mobile communications a very
attractive market for providers who wish to make their way
and satisfy the great demand required by users. Due to the
limitations of the radio spectrum and the unavailability of
licenses for new bands, new service providers should seek
to implement new technologies which allow them a greater
market impact. The service providers (SP) are faced with the
need to confront this growth in the number of users and their
bandwidth demand and this explains their constant quest
for innovation which enables total connection everywhere.
Despite their efforts, many users experience low reception
in indoor environments. This is due to the present mobile
network model, also called macrocell, whose signal will
become significantly lessened by factors such as distance,
climate, and obstacles.
In order to solve the issues related to the increase of
mobile data and of the lessening of the signal in indoor
environments, various technologies are being developed and
integrated within the present model of mobile communica-
tions such as Cognitive Radio Networks and Heterogeneous
Nets. This paper is focused on the solutions provided by
HetNets and, more specifically, on one of its key elements:
the small cells technology: micro-, pico-, and femtocells [2].
This technology has been developed and deployed over the
latest years making use of small stations connected to the
Internet able to capture the signal of users and route the calls
towards the mobile network [3], thus achieving significant
improvements in data speed, availability, and coverage [4, 5].
The integration of this technology is feasible from a technical
point of view as far as it incorporates improvements to the
network, but significant challenges are still pending for its
full deployment. One of them is a feasibility study which
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makes it attractive for service providers in economic terms by
considering the necessary improvements in infrastructures
[6, 7] and the added value comparedwith the rest of providers
who would not implement this technology [8].
The limitations and challenges to the development suc-
cess of a Hetnet are discussed in [9], where a theoretical
model was proposed to show the effectiveness of incorpo-
rating the HetNets into the existing network model. In [5,
10] a study was carried out to find out which economic
incentive would obtain a macrocells service provider (MSP)
that implements the femtocells service. This model shows
the feasibility of implementing the service for an existing
SP but does not incorporates the entry of a new SP and
the competition in the market. In addition, the behavior
of users over time and the dynamic reuse of resources are
not studied. Authors in [11] proposed an economic model
that motivates that a small cell service provider (SSP) leases
part of its resources to a MSP, and in this way the MSP
increases the capacity of its networks. This model makes a
dynamic control of the resources that the MSP leases, which
allows using the resources of the small sell network more
efficiently.Themodel also takes into account the evolutionary
users’ behavior regarding which network is connected. On
the other hand, in our paper a new service provider (SP)
implements the technology of small cells to compete with
the MSP for the users with a dynamic price control variable,
the SSP resources vary over time, and the evolutionary users’
behaviors regarding subscribing the SP are analyzed. There
are models which study the entry of a new SP as in [12],
where the effects of the entry of an SP that uses femtocells to
compete with the MSP are analyzed.The results show that all
system agents improve their welfare with the implementation
of femtocells technology, but as it is a static model, it does not
consider the evolutionary behavior of users or the dynamic
reuse of resources. Additionally, in [13] a similar model is
studied where the interactions between a MSP, a SSP, and
users are considered as a dynamic three-stage game, but in
this model there is no reuse of existing resources. There
are a lot of papers that analyze economic models that allow
the integration of small cell technology in existing mobile
telephony networks; in all of them it is concluded that there
is an incentive for service providers to improve the quality of
service and increase the capacity of the network as well as the
spectral efficiency of the transmission channel.
The main contributions of the paper are as follows:
(i) An economic model is developed for analyzing the
implementation of the small cells technology and
the effects in the market of the incorporation of a
new provider offering new technologies for mobile
communications.
(ii) An alternative is proposed for the deployment of
mobile networks, which allows increasing the density
of users using small cells by reusing the excess
of bandwidth of the clients of the Internet Server
Provider (ISP) service.
(iii) A dynamic model is analyzed which allows delving
into the evolution of the users’ behavior and the
competition between the SPswhen the resources vary.
(iv) A dynamic reuse of resources is employed in order to
use the bandwidth not used by the user of the Internet
service of the ISP more efficiently.
(v) It is demonstrated that the users improve the quality
of service obtained due to the fact that the new
technology in the market increases the resources and
improves the efficiency; in addition the price compe-
tition between SPs reduces the prices charged to the
users. All these things improve the users’ welfare.
(vi) The analysis demonstrates the viability of the entry of
the SSP. In addition, it is shown how profits increase
when the resources increase and decrease when the
MSP’s spectral efficiency decreases.
The paper is structured as follows.Themodel is described
in Section 2. In Section 3, the game analysis is performed.The
numerical results and discussion of scenarios are shown in
Section 4. Finally, Section 5 draws the conclusions.
2. Model Description
Two operators that provide fixed wireless service (MSP and
SSP) and a set of𝑁 users are considered, as shown in Figure 1.
The MSP is a conventional operator and owns a set of BS,
each serving a macrocell that provides full coverage on the
service area. The SSP deploys a radio access network (RAN)
consisting only of small cells reusing the resources of an
Internet Service Provider (ISP) to provide the mobile service.
The coverage areas of the small cells are disjoint, included in
the service area of the MSP and covering only a fraction of
the latter. In the sequel, to simplify notation, it is considered
without any loss of generality that the RAN of the MSP is
composed of a single macrocell. Both SPs compete to serve
the users inside the small cells.
The bandwidth available to the MSP is denoted by 𝐵𝑚(𝑡).
The SSP deploys a total of 𝐾 small cells. It refers to the 𝑖th
small cell as 𝑠𝑖 and the available bandwidth is obtained by
reusing the resources of the ISP to provide the service in the
following way: given that the ISP can offer a bandwidth of 𝐵𝑖
and the clients of the Internet service only uses 𝐵𝑖(1 − 𝑟𝑖(𝑡)),
the remaining bandwidth can be used to provide the service
ofmobile communications, that is,𝐵𝑠𝑖(𝑡) = 𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑖(𝑡), where 𝑟𝑖(𝑡)
is the bandwidth fraction available shown in Figure 2. The
area of the macrocell not overlapped with the coverage area
of any small cell is referred to as 𝑠0, where 𝐵𝑠0 = 0. While the
MSP holds a license to exploit a spectrum band, the SSP
does not hold such a license, but a generic authorization for
providing wireless communications services.
2.1. Users. Assuming that there are 𝑁 users distributed
thought the coverage area of the MSP. Users make their
subscription decision according to the expected utility and
independently from one another. To determine with which
SP the users subscribe, the user’s utility proposed in [14] is
used which integrates the following:
(i) The perceived rate reflects the fact that the higher
rate the user is allocated, the greater the utility is;
it is obtained in the same way as in [13–15], where
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the perceived rate depends directly on the perceived
spectral efficiency and on the amount of bandwidth
subscribed, in such a way that the perceived rate by
the MSP in 𝑠𝑖 is 𝜃𝑛𝑚𝑖𝑏𝑚, where 𝜃𝑛𝑚𝑖 is the perceived
spectral efficiency by a user 𝑛 from a MSPs’ BS,
normalized in [0, 1], and the perceived rate by the
SSP is 𝜃𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑠. However, given that the area of the
small cells is relatively small, we can assume that𝜃𝑛𝑠𝑖 = max(𝜃𝑛𝑚) = 1, and therefore, the perceived rate
by the SSP can be simplified to 𝑏𝑠 ∀𝑠𝑖.
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(ii) The amount of bandwidth subscribed by each user
with the MSP and SSP is 𝑏𝑚(𝑡) and 𝑏𝑠(𝑡), respectively.
(iii) The payment for the (maximum) achievable rate𝑏 affects the utility through a negative exponential
function (i.e., 𝑒−𝑏⋅𝑝). This is a similar effect to the
one achieved by a quasilinear utility and a budget
constraint, where the payment for the rate is linear
(i.e., −𝑏 ⋅ 𝑝). Although the latter is a more common
model in network economics, it is argued that our
proposal reflects more realistically how the spectrum
scarcity faced by a service provider is translated to the
user. The payment made by the users for the amount
of bandwidth subscribed per time unit with the MSP
and SSP is 𝑝𝑚(𝑡)𝑏𝑚(𝑡) and 𝑝𝑠(𝑡)𝑏𝑠(𝑡), respectively.
The utility of a user that subscribes to the MSP or to the SSP
is, respectively,
𝑢𝑚𝑖 (𝜃𝑚𝑖 , 𝑏𝑚, 𝑝𝑚, 𝑡) = 𝜃𝑚𝑖𝑏𝑚 (𝑡) 𝑒−𝑝𝑚(𝑡)𝑏𝑚(𝑡),
𝑢𝑠𝑖 (𝑏𝑠, 𝑝𝑠, 𝑡) = 𝑏𝑠 (𝑡) 𝑒−𝑝𝑠(𝑡)𝑏𝑠(𝑡).
(1)
Given that we consider rational users, they subscribe the
bandwidth that maximizes their utility:
𝑏∗𝑚 (𝑡) = arg max
𝑏𝑚(𝑡)>0
𝑢𝑚𝑖 (𝜃𝑚, 𝑏𝑚, 𝑝𝑚, 𝑡) = 1𝑝𝑚 (𝑡) ,
𝑏∗𝑠 (𝑡) = arg max
𝑏𝑠(𝑡)>0
𝑢𝑠𝑖 (𝑏𝑠, 𝑝𝑠, 𝑡) = 1𝑝𝑠 (𝑡) ;
(2)
therefore the user’s utility given that they make an optimal
decision of bandwidth is
𝑢∗𝑚𝑖 (𝜃𝑚𝑖 , 𝑝𝑚, 𝑡) = 𝜃𝑚𝑖𝑒
−1
𝑝𝑚 (𝑡) , (3)
𝑢∗𝑠𝑖 (𝑝𝑠, 𝑡) = 𝑢∗𝑠 (𝑝𝑠, 𝑡) = 𝑒
−1
𝑝𝑠 (𝑡) , (4)
where 𝑢∗𝑚𝑖 and 𝑢∗𝑠 denote the maximum utility of the users
that are in 𝑠𝑖 and subscribe to the MSP and SSP, respectively.
Lastly, the utility perceived by the users who do not subscribe
the service is 𝑢∗𝑜 = 0, which is consistent with a user sub-
scribing zero bandwidth.
We define 𝑥𝑚𝑖(𝑡) and 𝑥𝑠𝑖(𝑡) as the population ratio that
subscribes to the MSP and SSP, respectively, in the small
cell 𝑠𝑖, so the number of users subscribing to MSP in 𝑠𝑖 is𝑁𝑖(𝑡)𝑥𝑚𝑖(𝑡) and the SSP is𝑁𝑖(𝑡)𝑥𝑠𝑖(𝑡), where𝑁𝑖 are the users
in 𝑠𝑖,𝑁 = ∑𝑖𝑁𝑖. In addition, the bandwidth demanded can-
not be greater than the bandwidth available, where the band-
width demanded to the MSP and the SSP is, respectively,
𝑄𝑚 (𝑝𝑚, 𝑥𝑚, 𝑡) = 𝑁 (𝑡) 𝑥𝑚 (𝑡) 𝑏∗𝑚 (𝑡) ,
𝑄𝑠 (𝑝𝑠, 𝑥𝑠, 𝑡) = 𝑁 (𝑡) 𝑥𝑠 (𝑡) 𝑏∗𝑠 (𝑡) . (5)
These demands are limited by the available bandwidth of
the corresponding operator, 𝑁𝑖(𝑡)𝑥𝑚𝑖(𝑡)𝑏∗𝑚(𝑡) ≤ 𝐵𝑚(𝑡) and𝑁𝑖(𝑡)𝑥𝑚𝑖(𝑡)𝑏∗𝑠 (𝑡) ≤ 𝐵𝑠𝑖(𝑡). From these it is obtained that
𝑥𝑚𝑖 (𝑡) ≤ min( 𝑝𝑚 (𝑡)𝑁𝑖 (𝑡) /𝐵𝑚𝑖 (𝑡) , 1) ,
𝑥𝑠𝑖 (𝑡) ≤ min( 𝑝𝑠 (𝑡)𝑁𝑖 (𝑡) /𝐵𝑠𝑖 (𝑡) , 1) .
(6)
2.2. Service Providers. The SPs compete in price for the users.
Each SP posts a price per nominal-data-rate unit and time
unit, 𝑝𝑚(𝑡), 𝑝𝑠(𝑡), ∀𝑡 ∈ T, in order to maximize its profits
over the time horizon,T = [0, 𝑇]. The instantaneous profits
of the SP are defined as the income minus the costs in a
time instant, where the income are given by the amount that
users pay for all the demanded bandwidth, and the costs
are assumed to be zero. The instantaneous profits of SPs are
defined as
𝜋𝑚 (𝑝𝑚, 𝑥𝑚, 𝑡) = 𝑝𝑚 (𝑡) 𝑄𝑚 (𝑝𝑚, 𝑥𝑚, 𝑡) ,
𝜋𝑠 (𝑝𝑠, 𝑥𝑠, 𝑡) = 𝑝𝑠 (𝑡) 𝑄𝑠 (𝑝𝑠, 𝑥𝑠, 𝑡) . (7)
The profits of SPs over a time horizonT are defined as
Π𝑚 (𝑝𝑚, 𝑥𝑚) = ∫𝑇
0
[𝑒−𝜌𝑡𝜋𝑚 (𝑝𝑚, 𝑥𝑚, 𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡, (8)
Π𝑠 (𝑝𝑠, 𝑥𝑠) = ∫𝑇
0
[𝑒−𝜌𝑡𝜋𝑠 (𝑝𝑠, 𝑥𝑠, 𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡, (9)
where 𝑒−𝜌𝑡 is the discount rate, which influences in the future
payments [16, 17]. The SPs compete against each other to
determine the dynamic control strategy in equilibrium, that
is, 𝑝∗𝑚(𝑡) and 𝑝∗𝑠 (𝑡), given the profits obtained in (8) and (9).
3. Game Analysis
The interactions between the SPs and users are analyzed
using game theory [18], as a two-stage dynamic game, shown
in Figure 3. In the first stage, the SPs play a Stackelberg
differential game, where the control variable is the price
[19, 20]. Each SP posts a price per nominal-data-rate unit
and time unit, which is 𝑝𝑚(𝑡) for the MSP and 𝑝𝑠(𝑡) for the
SSP, where the MSP is the leader in the price choice and the
SSP in the follower. In the second stage, the users inside the
small cells can subscribe to either MSP’s or SSP’s service and
pay for a nominal data rate, which is equal to the bandwidth
allocated by the SP [5]. The behavior of the users that play
an evolutionary game to choose which SPs they subscribe
is modeled using the replicator dynamic [21, 22], shown
in Figure 3. The two-stage game is solved using backward
induction to guarantee the perfect subgame equilibrium [18].
3.1. Stage II: Evolutionary Game. In the second stage, the
decision that users should take is to which SP they have to
subscribe, knowing in advance the prices announced by the
SPs (see Figure 3). An evolutionary game is proposed that
allows reaching solutions in equilibrium given that players
Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing 5
STAGE I: Stackelberg Diﬀerential Game
The MSP announces pm (t)
The leader makes his optimal
choice of price,
anticipating the follower’s best
response (p∗s (pm, t)).
The follower makes his
optimal choice of price
according to the leader’s
optimal choice. (pm(t)).
Follower’s price, following the leader’s
price: p∗s (pm, t)
Equilibrium prices:
p∗m(p
∗
s , t) p
∗
s (p
∗
m, t)
Equilibrium users’ subscription:
x∗m (t), x
∗
s (t).
STAGE II: User Evolution Game
Users choose the service provider to subscribe, we model the
strategy learning of users by using replicator dynamic.
Figure 3: Hierarchical dynamic game framework for pricing and SP selection.
play repeatedly and can adjust their behavior over time by
learning on the fly. Evolutionary game is as follows:
(i) Strategies: S = {𝑚, 𝑠, 𝑜}, where 𝑚 means subscribing
to the MSP, 𝑠 subscribing to the SSP, and 𝑜 not
subscribing to the service.
(ii) Population states: 𝑋𝑖(𝑡) = {𝑥𝑚𝑖(𝑡), 𝑥𝑠𝑖(𝑡), 𝑥𝑜𝑖(𝑡)},
where 𝑥𝑚𝑖(𝑡) and 𝑥𝑠𝑖(𝑡) are the population ratios that
subscribe to the MSP and to the SSP, respectively, at
small cell 𝑠𝑖, and𝑥𝑜(𝑡) = 1−𝑥𝑚(𝑡)−𝑥𝑠(𝑡) is the fraction
of users not subscribing to the service at small cell 𝑠𝑖.
(iii) Payoffs: 𝑢𝑖(𝑡) = {𝑢∗𝑚𝑖(𝑡), 𝑢∗𝑠𝑖(𝑡), 𝑢∗𝑜𝑖(𝑡)}, where 𝑢∗𝑚𝑖(𝑡),𝑢∗𝑠𝑖(𝑡) are the users’ utilities perceived for the strategies
defined in (3) and (4), respectively, while 𝑢∗𝑜𝑖(𝑡) = 0.
(iv) Replicator dynamic: itmodels the evolutionary behav-
ior of the population among its different strategies
over time. The Replicator Dynamic [21, 22] is defined
as follows:
?̇?𝑗 (𝑡) = 𝛿𝑥𝑗 (𝑡) [𝑢𝑗 (𝜃𝑛𝑚, 𝑝𝑚, 𝑡) − 𝑈𝑖 (𝜃𝑛𝑚, 𝑝𝑚, 𝑝𝑠, 𝑡)] , (10)
where 𝑗 ∈ S, 𝛿 is the learning rate of the population,
which controls the frequency of strategy adaptation
for service selection and 𝑈𝑖(𝜃𝑛𝑚, 𝑝𝑚, 𝑝𝑠, 𝑡) is the user
utility function average per unit time:
𝑈𝑖 (𝜃𝑛𝑚, 𝑝𝑚, 𝑝𝑠, 𝑡) = 𝑥𝑚𝑖 (𝑝𝑚, 𝑡) 𝑢∗𝑚𝑖 (𝜃𝑛𝑚, 𝑝𝑚, 𝑡)
+ 𝑥𝑠𝑖 (𝑝𝑠, 𝑡) 𝑢∗𝑠𝑖 (𝑝𝑠, 𝑡) + 𝑥𝑜𝑖 (𝑡) 𝑢∗𝑜 ;
(11)
the replicator dynamics within a small cells have
the limitations of coverage and resources of the SPs
shown in (6).This differential equation indicates how
the population evolves along the time horizon and
given the initial state of the population, allowingmak-
ing predictions about the future behavior of the popu-
lation.The population will evolve to the Evolutionary
Stable Strategy (ESS), which is a stationary statewhere
the population shares will not change [18, 21].
3.2. Stage I: Stackelberg Differential Game. In the first stage,
SPs anticipate the evolutionary behavior of the population
(see Figure 3); based on this, the SPs will determine the
dynamic prices 𝑝∗𝑚(𝑡) and 𝑝∗𝑠 (𝑡). To analyze the decision
making, a Stackelberg differential game with an open-loop
control [19] is formulated, where the MSP is the leader and
the SSP is the follower. The SSP optimal control problem is
defined as
𝑝∗𝑠 (𝑡) = arg max
𝑝𝑠(𝑡)≥0
∫𝑇
0
[𝑒−𝜌𝑡𝜋𝑠 (𝑝𝑠, 𝑥𝑠, 𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡,
s.t. ?̇?𝑠𝑖 (𝑡)
= 𝛿𝑥𝑠𝑖 (𝑡) [𝑢𝑠𝑖 (𝑝𝑠, 𝑡) − 𝑈𝑖 (𝜃𝑛𝑚, 𝑝𝑚, 𝑝𝑠, 𝑡)] ,
𝑥𝑗 (0) = 𝑥𝑗0.
(12)
The MSP optimal control problem, given the behavior of the
SSP, is
𝑝∗𝑚 (𝑡) = arg max
𝑝𝑚(𝑡)≥0
∫𝑇
0
[𝑒−𝜌𝑡𝜋𝑚 (𝑝𝑚, 𝑥𝑚, 𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡,
s.t. 𝑝∗𝑠 = argmax𝑝𝑠≥0 ∫
𝑇
0
[𝑒−𝜌𝑡𝜋𝑠 (𝑝∗𝑠 , 𝑥𝑠, 𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡,
?̇?𝑚𝑖 (𝑡)
= 𝛿𝑥𝑚𝑖 (𝑡) [𝑢𝑚𝑖 (𝜃𝑛𝑚, 𝑝𝑚, 𝑡) − 𝑈𝑖 (𝜃𝑛𝑚, 𝑝𝑚, 𝑝∗𝑠 , 𝑡)] ,
𝑥𝑗 (0) = 𝑥𝑗0.
(13)
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The open-loop Stackelberg differential game is presented
as the two optimal control problems with restrictions des-
cribed in expressions (12) and (13), represented in the
Lagrange form. To solve them, the Pontryagin Maximum
Principle is used [23, 24], which provides us with the
necessary optimization conditions for the optimal control
problem given that it takes into account the effects of the
choosing the price by the SPs and generating a first immediate
effect through the instantaneous value of the profits of SP and
a second effect on the variation of the population state.
First, for the Lagrange problem of the follower, the
Hamiltonian function is defined as follows:
H𝑠 (𝑝𝑚, 𝑝𝑠, 𝑥𝑚𝑖 , 𝑥𝑠𝑖 , 𝜆𝑠𝑗, 𝑡)
= 𝜋𝑠 (𝑝𝑠, 𝑥𝑠, 𝑡)
+ 𝐾∑
𝑖=0
[𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑖 (𝑡) ?̇?𝑠𝑖 (𝑡) + 𝜆𝑠𝑚𝑖 (𝑡) ?̇?𝑚𝑖 (𝑡)] ,
(14)
where 𝜆𝑠𝑗(𝑡) is the costate variable associated with the state in
the 𝑗 state in time when it moves along the optimal trajectory,
where 𝑗 ∈ S.
The optimal control strategy𝑝∗𝑠 (𝑡) of the original problem
(10) alsomaximizes the correspondingHamiltonian function
[23]
𝑝∗𝑠 (𝑡) = argmaxH𝑠 (𝑝𝑚, 𝑝𝑠, 𝑥𝑚𝑖 , 𝑥𝑠𝑖 , 𝜆𝑠𝑗, 𝑡) . (15)
However, (15) it is only optimal if the multiplier vector is
defined to reflect the marginal impact of the state vector on
the profits of the SSP
𝜕H∗𝑠 (𝑝𝑚, 𝑝∗𝑠 , 𝑥𝑚𝑖 , 𝑥𝑠𝑖 , 𝜆𝑠𝑗, 𝑡)𝜕𝑥𝑗 (𝑡) = −?̇?𝑠𝑗 (𝑡) + 𝜌𝜆𝑠𝑗 (𝑡) , (16)
whereH∗𝑠 is obtained from (15).
In comparison with the SSP, the Hamiltonian function of
the MSP takes into account the maximization of the profits
of the SSP, the dynamics of the variables of the costates of
theMSP and the variation of the costates.TheMSPHamilton
function is defined as
H𝑚 (𝑝𝑚, 𝑝𝑠, 𝑥𝑚𝑖 , 𝑥𝑠𝑖 , 𝜆𝑚𝑗, 𝜆𝑠𝑗, 𝛼𝑠𝑗, 𝑡) = 𝜋𝑚 (𝑝𝑚, 𝑥𝑚, 𝑡)
+ 𝐾∑
𝑖=0
[𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑖 (𝑡) ?̇?𝑚𝑖 (𝑡) + 𝜆𝑚𝑠𝑖 (𝑡) ?̇?𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑖 (𝑡) ?̇?𝑠𝑠𝑖 (𝑡)
+ 𝛼𝑠𝑚𝑖 (𝑡) ?̇?𝑠𝑚𝑖 (𝑡)] ,
(17)
where 𝜆𝑚𝑗(𝑡) is the costate variable associated with the state
in the 𝑗 state when it moves along the optimal trajectory and𝛼𝑠𝑗 is a variable associated with the effect of the variation of
the population of the SSP on the MSP.
Applying the PontryaginMaximumPrinciple in the same
way aswith the SSP, the following optimization conditions are
necessary to find the optimal control strategies of the original
problem 𝑝∗𝑚(𝑡)
𝜕H𝑚 (𝑝𝑚, 𝑝𝑠, 𝑥𝑚𝑖 , 𝑥𝑠𝑖 , 𝜆𝑚𝑗, 𝜆𝑠𝑗, 𝛼𝑠𝑗, 𝑡)𝜕𝑝𝑚 (𝑡) = 0 (18)
𝜕H∗𝑚 (𝑝∗𝑚, 𝑝𝑠, 𝑥𝑚𝑖 , 𝑥𝑠𝑖 , 𝜆𝑚𝑗, 𝜆𝑠𝑗, 𝛼𝑠𝑗, 𝑡)𝜕𝑥𝑗 (𝑡)
= −?̇?𝑠𝑗 (𝑡) + 𝜌𝜆𝑠𝑗 (𝑡)
(19)
𝜕H∗𝑚 (𝑝∗𝑚, 𝑝𝑠, 𝑥𝑚𝑖 , 𝑥𝑠𝑖 , 𝜆𝑚𝑗, 𝜆𝑠𝑗, 𝛼𝑠𝑗, 𝑡)𝜕𝜆𝑠𝑗 (𝑡)
= −?̇?𝑠𝑗 (𝑡) + 𝜌𝛼𝑠𝑗 (𝑡) .
(20)
The first step is to solve the optimal prices that the service
providers announce, (15) and (18). These prices are based
on the state of the population (𝑋𝑖(𝑡)) and the costates (𝜆𝑚𝑗,𝜆𝑖𝑗, and 𝛼𝑠𝑗). The optimal prices must be replaced in the opti-
mization conditions of the Pontryagin Maximum Principle
((10), (16), (19), and (20)), obtaining the following system of
differential equations:
?̇?𝑗 (𝑡) = 𝛿𝑥𝑗 (𝑡) [𝑢𝑗 (𝜃𝑛𝑚, 𝑝𝑚, 𝑡) − 𝑈𝑖 (𝜃𝑛𝑚, 𝑝𝑚, 𝑝𝑠, 𝑡)] ,
?̇?𝑠𝑗 (𝑡) = 𝜌𝜆𝑠𝑗 (𝑡) − 𝜕H
∗
𝑠 (𝑝𝑚, 𝑝∗𝑠 , 𝑥𝑚𝑖 , 𝑥𝑠𝑖 , 𝜆𝑠𝑗, 𝑡)𝜕𝑥𝑗 (𝑡) ,
?̇?𝑚𝑗 (𝑡) = 𝜌𝜆𝑚𝑗 (𝑡)
− 𝜕H∗𝑚 (𝑝∗𝑚, 𝑝𝑠, 𝑥𝑚𝑖 , 𝑥𝑠𝑖 , 𝜆𝑚𝑗, 𝜆𝑠𝑗, 𝛼𝑠𝑗, 𝑡)𝜕𝑥𝑗 (𝑡) ,
?̇?𝑠𝑗 (𝑡) = 𝜌𝛼𝑠𝑗 (𝑡)
− 𝜕H∗𝑚 (𝑝∗𝑚, 𝑝𝑠, 𝑥𝑚𝑖 , 𝑥𝑠𝑖 , 𝜆𝑚𝑗, 𝜆𝑠𝑗, 𝛼𝑠𝑗, 𝑡)𝜕𝜆𝑠𝑗 (𝑡) ;
(21)
This problem is a two-point boundary value problem
(TPBVP), where the initial variables of the state of the popu-
lation (𝑋0) and the final variables of the costates of the popu-
lation 𝜆𝑗𝑗(𝑇) = 0 ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑖 = {1, 2, . . . , 𝐾,𝑚, 𝑜} and 𝛼𝑠𝑗(𝑇) =0 ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑖 = {1, 2, . . . , 𝐾,𝑚, 𝑜} are known. Solving the
TPBVP [25], the optimal vectors of the states and costates
are obtained along the time horizon, that is, 𝑥∗𝑗 (𝑡), 𝜆∗𝑚𝑗(𝑡),𝜆∗𝑠𝑗(𝑡), and𝛼∗𝑠𝑗(𝑡). Replacing these optimal vectors in the prices
that were obtained from solving (15) and (18), the prices in
equilibrium announced by SPs are obtained.
4. Results and Discussion
In this section some results are presented in order to illustrate
the capabilities of our model and analysis and to provide an
insight into the system behavior. In order to quantify the
viability of the model, the users’ welfare (UW) and social
welfare (SW) functions are used. The UW is defined as the
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Table 1: Parameter setting.
Parameter Value
𝑁 400 users𝐴𝑚 10000m2𝐵𝑚 60MHz𝐴 𝑠𝑖 2000m2𝐾 5 small cells𝜌 0
aggregate utility of all the users obtained along the time
horizon. It allows us to quantify the welfare of the entire
population of users and is obtained as
UW
= ∫𝑇
0
[ 𝐾∑
𝑖=0
(𝑁𝑖𝑥𝑚𝑖 (𝑡) 𝑢∗𝑚𝑖 (𝑡) + 𝑁𝑖𝑥𝑠 (𝑡) 𝑢∗𝑠𝑖 (𝑡))] 𝑑𝑡,
(22)
where 𝑁𝑖𝑥𝑚𝑖(𝑡)𝑢∗𝑚𝑖(𝑡) and 𝑁𝑖𝑥𝑠𝑢∗𝑠𝑖(𝑡) are a the utilities that
users who subscribe receive. The SW is defined as the
aggregated utility of all the users and SPs and is obtained as
SW
= Π𝑚 (𝑝𝑚, 𝑥𝑚) + Π𝑠 (𝑝𝑚, 𝑥𝑚)
+ ∫𝑇
0
[ 𝐾∑
𝑖=0
(𝑁𝑖𝑥𝑚𝑖 (𝑡) 𝑢∗𝑚𝑖 (𝑡) + 𝑁𝑖𝑥𝑠 (𝑡) 𝑢∗𝑠𝑖 (𝑡))] 𝑑𝑡.
(23)
The numerical resolution of the dynamic problem of
decision making was made using the function “BVP4C”
of MATLAB [26, 27], which allows solving the system of
differential equations of (21) given the initial state of the
population and the final state of the costates. The scenario
was evaluated along a time horizon of [0–100] with a jump
of ℎ = 0.01 and the parameters were varied to know the effect
that has the spectral efficiency, the bandwidth of the SPs, and
the dynamic reuse of the resources of the SSP. The results are
obtained assuming a small cell network that covers 100% of
the BS area of the MSP. Given that the coverage areas of the
small cells are disjoint 𝐴𝑚 = ∑𝑖 𝐴 𝑠𝑖 . The system parameters
values are those shown in Table 1.
4.1. Effect of Spectral Efficiency. Figures 4, 5, and 6 show the
effect of the spectral efficiency obtained with the MSP by
all users (𝜃𝑚) on the scenario, evaluating the evolutionary
behavior of users (𝑥∗𝑚(𝑡), 𝑥∗𝑠 (𝑡), and 𝑥∗𝑜 (𝑡)), the dynamics of
prices in equilibrium (𝑝∗𝑚(𝑡) and 𝑝∗𝑠 (𝑡)), the total profits of
the SPs, the SW, and UW. The results were obtained for the
following parameters in each of the small cells: there are𝑁𝑖 =80users, all the users inside the small cells perceive on average
the same spectral frequency with the BS of MSP, the learning
rate of the population is 𝛿 = 0.68, the bandwidth available
for the SSP is 𝐵𝑠𝑖 = 𝐵𝑠 = 10.4MHz in all small cells, and the
initial state of the population is 𝑥∗𝑚𝑖(0) = 0.1, 𝑥∗𝑠𝑖(0) = 0.1, and𝑥∗𝑜𝑖(0) = 0.8 ∀𝑖.
In Figures 4(a) and 4(b) the evolution of MSP and SSP
prices over the time horizon for different values of 𝜃𝑚 is
shown and the following is observed:
(i) Only the time interval [0, 10] is represented graphi-
cally, because at time 10 the population almost reaches
the ESS, that is, the population is in a stationary
strategy and its decisions do not change, and this
makes the prices remain constant in the interval[10–100].
(ii) The lower 𝜃𝑚, the lower the price announced by the
MSP because it has to compensate for the low spectral
efficiency that users receive. On the other hand, the
lower the spectral efficiency, the higher the price that
the SSP can announce, because users perceive a better
utility with him.
(iii) The prices increase with the time, because users that
do not subscribe to the service (𝑥∗𝑜𝑖(0) = 0.8) choose
to subscribe to the SPs, and given that the subscribed
users increase the price announced by the SPs can
be higher (there are the same resources and a greater
demand).
In Figures 5(a) and 5(b) the evolutionary behavior of
the subscribing population is shown with the MSP and SSP,
respectively. It is observed that the users always preferred
the service and therefore they will evolve over time until
they subscribe to a SP; besides, depending on the spectral
efficiency perceived, they will prefer to subscribe with one or
the other SP, in such a way that the higher 𝜃𝑚 is, the more the
users prefer to subscribe with the MSP. Only the time values
of [0–10] are shown because at that time the population
reaches or approaches the ESS; therefore, the population is
in a stationary strategy.
In Figure 6 the profits from the perspective of the SPs and
the users’ and social welfare are shown. It is observed that the
profits of the MSP increase as 𝜃𝑚 increases and that the SSP’s
profits decrease in the same amount. The users are benefited
if 𝜃𝑚 increases, as shown in the UW, which also increases
the SW. Additionally, it is expected that the SW, UW, and
the profits of the SPs will increase if the initial state of the
population of users who do not subscribe the service is lower,
given that 80% of users start not to subscribe.
4.2. Effect of the Available Bandwidth of the SSP. In Figures
7, 8, and 9 the effect that the available resources of the SSP
have on the scenario is shown, evaluating the evolutionary
behavior of the users, the dynamics of equilibrium prices, the
total profits of the SPs, the SW, and the UW.The results were
obtained for the following parameters in each of the small
cells: there are 𝑁𝑖 = 80 users, who perceive on average the
same spectral efficiency 𝜃𝑚𝑖 = 𝜃𝑚 = 0.8 bits/s/Hz, the initial
state of the population is 𝑥∗𝑚𝑖(0) = 0.1, 𝑥∗𝑠𝑖(0) = 0.1, and𝑥∗𝑜𝑖(0) = 0.8 ∀𝑖, and the learning rate of the population is𝛿 = 0.68.
In Figures 7(a) and 7(b) the behavior of the prices of the
MSP and SSP are shown along the evaluated time horizon
(𝑇 = 10) as a function of 𝐵𝑠 and the following is observed:
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Figure 4: SP’s prices on the time horizon as a function of 𝜃𝑚.
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Figure 5: Evolutionary behavior of population ratios as a function of 𝜃𝑚.
(i) Only the time interval [0, 10] is represented graph-
ically, because at time 10 the population arrives or
approaches the ESS; that is, the population is in a
stationary strategy and its decisions do not change,
and this makes the prices remain constant in the
interval [10–100].
(ii) The higher 𝐵𝑠 is, the lower the price the SPs announ-
ces, because the SSP has more resources to compete
and this means that both SPs have to lower prices.
(iii) The prices increase with the time, this is because the
number of users subscribed also increases with the
time, and it is needed to satisfy a greater bandwidth
demand with the same resources.
In Figures 8(a) and 8(b) the evolutionary behavior of the
subscribing population with the MSP and SSP, respectively,
is shown. It was observed that the users always preferred
the service and therefore they will evolve over time until
they subscribe an SP; in addition, the higher the available
resources of the SSP, the higher the users who want to sub-
scribe with it. At 𝑇 = 10 the population arrives or approaches
the ESS.
In Figure 9 the profits are shown from the perspective
of the SPs, and users’ and social welfare are evaluated. It is
observed that the profits of the SSP increase with 𝐵𝑠 and that
theMSP’s profits diminish in the same amount. If resources in
the scenario increase, the SW andUW increase. Additionally,
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Figure 7: SP’s prices on the time horizon as a function of 𝐵𝑠.
it is expected that SW, UW, and the SP’s profits increase if the
initial state of the population of users that do not subscribe to
the service is lower, given that 80% of users do not subscribe.
4.3. Effect of Dynamic Reuse of the Resources of SSP. In this
section, approaching the available resources of the network
from a traffic study at the University of Washington [28], the
bandwidth available to service the SSP at each instant of time
is shown in Figure 10 [29].
In Figures 11(a) and 11(b) the equilibrium prices for the
MSP and SSP, respectively, are shown, considering that the
SSP’s bandwidth available varies. It is observed that the SSP
prices are inversely proportional to the available bandwidth
and the prices are displaced 0.8 due to the spectral efficiency
that users perceive. It is also observed that when the learning
rate is low (𝛿 = 0.1), it evolves more smoothly; i.e., users do
not learn as quickly as resources vary.
In Figures 12(a) and 12(b) the evolution of the distribution
of the population for theMSP and SSP, respectively, is shown.
It is observed that the population of the SSP has a direct
relation to resources; that is, the higher the resources of the
SSP, the higher the population that subscribes to the SSP. On
the other hand, the higher the resources of the SSP, the lower
the population that subscribes to the MSP. It is also observed
that when the learning rate is low (𝛿 = 0.1), the distribution
of the population varies more slowly; that is, the population
do not learn as fast as the resources vary.
As there is a dynamic reuse of resources by the SSP, its
profits will increase as the available resources increase and
the user’s learning rate increases, given that this will allow
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Figure 8: Evolutionary behavior of population ratios as a function of 𝐵𝑠.
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Figure 12: Evolutionary behavior of the population.
the fact that the decisions of the users adjust more quickly
to variations of resources. Given the existence of a dynamic
reuse of resources of the SSP there will be more resources in
themodel, which lowers the SSP’s prices and increases the SW
and the UW.
5. Conclusions
This paper proposes a business model where a service
provider implements small cells technology (SSP) and com-
petes against the existing macrocell provider or MSP. The
limitations of this technology were taken into accounts such
as limited availability and coverage, dynamic reutilization of
resources, and the decisions of users and service providers,
while taking into consideration the influence of each provider
over the decisions of their competitor.
Game theory enabled us to predict the behavior of users
and providers on the basis that users and providers take
the decisions that suit them best and allowed us to know
the effects of a new provider on the market of mobile
communications, which are as follows:
(i) The users get a better service due to the fact that
the SSP forces the MSP to lower prices, as the SSP
increases the spectrum efficiency of users and the
resources available in the scenario. In addition, all
users would prefer to subscribe to the service, and
they will adapt their decisions to subscribe.
(ii) The SSP goes into the communication market well
aware that their profits are guaranteed.This is because
the SSP is offering better spectrum efficiency and has
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competitive prices in relation to the MSP, as far as
users want to subscribe to the new service.
(iii) The MSP becomes aggrieved by the new SSP in the
market because its profits are lower, and the profits
are lower as the spectrum efficiency is lower. This
suggests that the MSP should improve the value of
their services as perceived by the users so their profits
do not become affected by competence.
(iv) The SSP’s entry improves the users’ welfare and social
welfare.
Given the results shown, the viability of providing a new
small cells connectivity service by reusing dynamically the
excess of bandwidth of the clients of an Internet Service
Provider has been demonstrated.
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